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International Legal Updates
United States
United States Linked to
Rendition Practice in East
Africa
The U.S. government faces increasing
criticism for engaging in extraordinary
rendition — the practice of removing individuals in the custody of one country to
another, where they are interrogated and
often tortured on behalf of another nation.
This tactic has been used by the United
States in its War on Terror and has raised a
number of instances in which U.S. officials
have sanctioned, and arguably participated
in, heinous human rights violations. What
little is known of the U.S. practice implies
involvement in the secret and illegal detainment of men, women, and children. Recent
discoveries about activities acknowledged
by U.S. and Ethiopian officials in East
Africa shed light on a partnership with
the governments of Kenya, Somalia, and
Ethiopia that has led to the disappearance
of at least 140 individuals fleeing violence
in Somalia.
In September 2006, the United States
launched several bombing raids in Mogadishu, Somalia, targeting Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, the alleged al-Qa’ida member and mastermind of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. Thousands of individuals fled
for the Kenyan border. The Kenyan antiterror police, who were created with U.S.
funding, captured at least 150 individuals
without acknowledgment of their detention or disclosure of their whereabouts,
and placed the prisoners on secret flights
departing from Kenya. Flight manifests
documenting all passengers on board name
85 people, including at least 11 children
and 13 women, including at least two
pregnant women who gave birth while in
custody, as well as Fazul Abdullah’s wife.
The prisoners were taken to Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia and harshly interrogated by U.S.
officials. Some prisoners were released
and only one was charged by Ethiopian
officials. The whereabouts of over 40 prisoners remains unknown.

In an interview aired on the U.S. television program Frontline, former U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special
agent Jack Cloonan stated that he believes
the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) not only knew about these events
but were likely crucial in orchestrating
them.
The Muslim Human Rights Forum filed
for an injunction in Kenyan court in September 2007, challenging the legality of
the detentions. Family members of the
prisoners who spoke out publicly have
disappeared. Meanwhile, in March 2008,
President Bush vetoed legislation that
would ban the CIA from using interrogation techniques more coercive than those
approved by the U.S. military.
While the United States and the international community have debated the legality of U.S. interrogation techniques and
detention of alleged terror suspects, the
U.S. partnership in East Africa reveals
U.S. complacency in the taking of women
and children as hostages in the course of
these secret investigations. Little is known
about the treatment of the detained women
and children, though the potential for additional human rights violations is chillingly
present. Amnesty International denounced
the actions of the United States and its
East African partners and claimed that the
detention of these individuals “violates the
right to liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”

Supreme Court Upholds
execution by Lethal Injection
But Imposes Moratorium on
Death Penalty While Deciding
Case
On September 25, 2007 the Supreme
Court (Court) granted certiorari to hear
Baze v. Rees. In Baze, the Court addressed
the constitutionality of a particular method
of execution for the first time since 1878.
The case did not address the constitutionality of capital punishment generally.
Although the Court ultimately upheld the
contested method of execution by lethal
32

injection, in granting certiorari, it enacted
a de facto moratorium on executions until
it issued its decision.
At question in Baze was whether lethal
injection as method of execution violates
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which bans cruel and unusual punishment. The Petitioners in Baze were
each convicted for murders in the state of
Kentucky and sentenced to death. After
exhausting all levels of appeal in state
and federal courts, Petitioners filed a civil
action in the Supreme Court, claiming
that the method of lethal injection used by
Kentucky “create[s] an unnecessary risk of
pain and suffering.”
The execution protocol used in Ken
tucky involves the administration of a
three-drug formula, intended to administer deadly potassium nitrate only after a
prisoner is unconscious. The executioner
first administers Thiopental, a short-acting
anesthetic that is not widely used in medical practice today. Second, the executioner
delivers pancuronium, which paralyzes
the prisoner’s voluntary muscles without
numbing potential pain and suffering. If
the prisoner wakes after the brief effects of
the Thiopental wear off, he or she is fully
conscious and capable of feeling pain, yet
remains paralyzed and unable to communicate. Finally, the executioner injects the
prisoner with potassium chloride, causing
cardiac arrest. A doctor and coroner then
verify the cause of death. Used alone or in
combination with pancronium, potassium
chloride would cause a human to scream in
pain before ultimately undergoing cardiac
arrest.
The Petitioners argued that the Court
should add an “unnecessary risk of excruciating pain” test, while the State of Kentucky argued that standard is too broad,
and instead, a “substantial risk” of unnecessary pain test should apply.
In amicus briefs submitted to the Court,
the American Society of Anesthesiologists stated that physicians are ethically
prevented from participating in executions.
The nonprofit Anesthesia Awareness Cam-
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paign requested that the Court consider the
significant risk of “anesthesia awareness”
— a condition in which the patient regains
consciousness after anesthesia is administered but is unable to communicate.
On April 16, 2008, the Court announced
its ruling in Baze. In the seven-to-two decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of Kentucky’s lethal injection practice. To
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment,
the Court wrote, the practice must present
a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable
risk of harm.” According to the Court, the
Petitioners failed to prove this standard.
Since the Court issued its ruling in Baze,
ending the seven-month moratorium on
the death penalty, at least five states have
conducted a total of seven executions.
Despite the ruling, an Ohio judge
recently ordered that state to stop using
a lethal injection practice similar to that
contested in Baze, noting that although the
practice was constitutional, it still would
violate an Ohio statute requiring that execution by lethal injection “quickly and
painlessly cause death.” Instead, the judge
ordered the state to use a large dose of barbiturates in conducting executions.
A 2007 Gallup poll shows that 69
percent of U.S. citizens favor of the death
penalty, up two percent from 2006. Currently, 37 states use lethal injection as the
primary means of execution. Yet the number of executions has dropped in several
states prior to the Court’s decision to hear
Baze due to concerns about the methods
employed.
In December 2007, New Jersey Governor John Corzine signed the first legislative
repeal of the death penalty in the United
States since 1965. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, this reflects a
larger shift in national sentiment towards
the death penalty. The international community shows a significant trend away
from the death penalty: on December 11,
2007, the United Nations General Assembly called for immediate moratorium or
abolition of the capital punishment. One
hundred four nations voted in favor of the
resolution, and only 54 voted against it.

International Violence Against
Women Act Proposed on the
Senate Floor
On October 31, 2007, U.S. Democratic
Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware introduced the International Violence Against
Women Act (IVAWA) to the Senate. The
bill proposes creating an Office of Women’s Global Initiatives (Office), mandates
that the President of the United States
“develop and commence implementation
of a comprehensive, five-year international
strategy to prevent and respond to violence
against women and girls internationally,”
and requires special reporting mechanisms
on the status of female refugees and other
vulnerable populations. The Senate recommended IVAWA to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it awaits
debate. IVAWA is currently sponsored by
13 Senators and was drafted in collaboration with over 100 non-governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch
and the Global AIDS Alliance.
The Office would be located within the
Department of State. It would coordinate
all international women’s issues and direct
and implement a comprehensive national
strategy to prevent violence against women
worldwide. From 2008 to 2012, the Office
would receive $10 million annually to
administer such programs. It would be
established within the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID),
where it would receive $15 million annually from 2008 to 2012 to carry out USAID
activities to improve the status of women.
The IVAWA would identify between
ten and 20 ethnically different countries
that face particularly high levels of violence against women; determine how this
violence negatively impacts the growth of
each country; assess each government’s
efforts to control such violence; and
develop programs to run in coordination
with those governments. The goals are
to improve women’s status with regards
to the law, health, education, economic
advancement, public awareness, and social
norms.
When presenting IVAWA, Senator
Biden stated that violence against women
could no longer be viewed as simply a
familial or cultural issue, but rather must be
seen as a pervasive and deleterious human
rights violation. Senator Biden hopes that
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IVAWA will confront the crises of HIV/
AIDS, human trafficking, female genital
mutilation, rape, and the use of violence
against women as a weapon during periods
of conflict.
Perhaps acknowledging that serious
issues of violence against women exist
within the United States, Senator Biden
conceded that no single country has the
answer to this problem, nor does IVAWA
propose to fix it. IVAWA represents a concerted effort to reduce the occurrence of
violence against women in regions of the
world where it prevents respect and dignity
for human rights and hinders growth and
development.

Latin America
Cuba: Foreign Minister Signs
Human Rights Treaties
On February 28, 2008, Cuban Foreign
Minister Felipe Pérez Roque signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), two major international human rights treaties that former
Cuban President Fidel Castro opposed for
over three decades. Among countless other
rights, the two treaties include the rights
to freedom of expression, association,
and movement. Specifically, the ICCPR
includes the right to freedom of association
in trade unions or political parties and the
right to vote in elections, but it excludes
the right to live in a multi-party democracy. The ICESCR, includes the right to
employment, fair wages, social security,
education, the freedom to form and join
trade unions, and the highest standard of
physical and mental healthcare.
In his long standing opposition to these
treaties, Fidel Castro argued that the ICCPR
could be a tool of “imperialism” against
Cuba. He also specifically opposed articles
on education, arguing that they could lead
to privatization, and on independent unions
because he believed these types of unions
only suited to capitalist countries. Despite
Fidel Castro’s opposition, on December
10, 2007 — while Fidel Castro was still
President — Pérez Roque announced
Cuba’s intention to sign the covenants and
open its doors to international scrutiny by
the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review in 2009.
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Through this process, the Council will
review Cuba’s fulfillment of its human
rights obligations and commitments. Soon
after Pérez Roque’s announcement, Fidel
Castro reminded Cubans of the reasons for
his fervent opposition to the covenants. In
February, four days after Raul Castro succeeded his brother as President, however,
Cuba signed the covenants. After signing
the covenants, Pérez Roque stressed that
the government would register “reservations or interpretative declarations it considers relevant.”
Amnesty International strongly supports the treaties and argues that, having signed them, Cuba should release the
58 individuals currently held as prisoners of conscience. Among those detained
are Alfredo Pulido López and Normando
Hernández González. Pulido López is a
human rights defender and dentist who
was ousted from his clinic and detained
in March 2003 on charges of being a
“counter-revolutionary.” While in detention, Pulido López has developed more
than seventeen different chronic illnesses,
including osteoporosis, hypoglycemia, and
chronic bronchitis. Likewise, Hernández
González was arrested under Article 91 of
the Cuban Penal Code, which condemns
“acts against the independence or territorial integrity of the state” for criticizing
state-run entities and services. He was
sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment in
March 2003. While in prison he has not
only been denied proper medical attention,
leading him to develop a serious gastrointestinal condition, but was also denied
the right to go to Costa Rica after Costa
Rican legislators obtained a humanitarian
visa for him. Cuban activist groups, among
them the Cuban Commission on Human
Rights and National Reconciliation, say
that the signing of ICCPR and ICESCR
is positive news and that they hope that it
marks a turning point for human rights in
that country.

Guatemala: Álvaro Colom
Opposes the Death Penalty
The Guatemalan Congress passed the
Law Regulating the Application of the
Death Penalty to those Sentenced to Death
in February. This bill gives the Head of
State the right to decide whether to grant
clemency to individuals on death row.

In 2002, Guatemala’s Constitutional
Court suspended the death penalty because
the existing law was not explicit as to
which body of government had the power
to grant clemency. Guatemala has not
applied the death penalty since June 2000
when it executed two members of a kidnapping ring. The Court ordered Congress
to amend the law to specify which body
has the authority to grant last-minute pardons to prisoners facing the death penalty. Six years later, Congress passed a
bill giving the President that power. The
law’s passage also removed the obstacle to
reintroducing the death penalty in light of
recent public outcry over the murder of 11
public transportation drivers and assistants
by youth gang members.
Advocates for the law, including former Presidential candidate Otto Pérez
Molina, argue that the death penalty is
necessary to deter violence. According to
the United Nations, Guatemala is the third
most violent country in Latin America,
with violence responsible for at least 16
deaths daily. Once Congress passed the
bill, international organizations, including Amnesty International, sent letters to
President Álvaro Colom, urging him not to
reinstate the death penalty but to seek better solutions to deter violence.

the death penalty does not necessarily
reduce violence, highlighting instances of
increased violence immediately following
the use of the death penalty in the United
States. He concluded that to reduce violence, the criminal justice system must be
more effective and criminal enforcement
more pervasive.
Despite his fervent opposition, Colom’s
veto may be easily overturned. To overturn it, Congress would need a two-thirds
majority — 105 of 158 votes. When Congress passed it in February, 140 members
supported it.

Soldiers Found Guilty of
Killing Counter-Narcotics
Agents in Colombia

The law gave the President 30 days to
decide whether to commute a prisoner’s
death sentence to the maximum 50-year
prison sentence. If the President did not
make a pronouncement in that time, the
execution would go forward. After the law
came into effect, 34 prisoners on death
row would receive 30 days to ask for the
President’s pardon.

On February 18, 2008, a Colombian
judge found Colonel Byron Carvajal Osorio and 14 other members of the military
guilty of aggravated homicide for a massacre in Jamundí, Colombia. This massacre occurred on May 22, 2006, when
a unit of the Colombian army killed an
informant and ten elite counter-narcotic
agents to prevent the discovery of between
220 to 440 pounds of cocaine hidden in a
psychiatric home belonging to the mafia.
The informant led the ten counter-narcotics
agents, who belonged to a U.S.-trained
counter-narcotics commission, to the psychiatric center to find cocaine. A few
months before this massacre, the Director
of the judicial police praised the counternarcotics commission for breaking up multiple drug rings, seizing over 4.4 tons of
cocaine, and capturing over 200 traffickers, including many wanted for extradition
to the United States.

On March 14, however, President Colom
vetoed the bill, stating that it violated principles established in Articles 2, 3, 15, 18,
19, and 46 of the Guatemalan constitution.
In addition, the President acknowledged
that Guatemala is party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, which contains specific provisions relating to the
use and extension of the death penalty and
proposes that states that have abolished the
death penalty do not reinstate it. He argued
that this bill was unconstitutional because
Article 46 of the constitution establishes
that “in matters relating to human rights,
the treaties and conventions ratified by
Guatemala take precedence over domestic law.” The President suggested that

Initially, the head of the Colombian
army announced that the massacre had been
a tragic case of “friendly fire” because the
soldiers had confused the police unit for
leftist rebels. Evidence collected immediately following the massacre, however,
revealed that the informant and agents
were unable to defend themselves from the
illegal attack. Minutes after the massacre,
the soldiers sent incriminating text messages later recovered by investigators. In
response to the discovery of this evidence,
Colombia’s Chief Criminal Investigator
Mario Iguarán, said that the deaths were
not the result of a mistake but rather “a
deliberate criminal decision,” and that the
army was “doing the bidding of drug traf-
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fickers.” In addition, government officials
collected 150 bullets and seven grenades.
After examining the bodies, investigators
declared that the men had not been killed
while in combat but in an unexpected
attack. Shortly after the massacre, Colonel
Carvajal Osorio, two other officers, and
twelve soldiers were accused of aggravated
homicide.
Soon after this episode, human rights
organizations demanded that those guilty
of the killings, in particular high-ranking
officers, be held accountable for their
crimes. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and
others charged that Colombia’s sentencing
practices convey “the message that abuses
are rarely, if ever, going to be punished.”
In a letter to Colombia’s President Alvaro
Uribe, HRW charged that in Colombia
“low-ranking officers sometimes get punished, but hardly ever is a commanding
officer prosecuted.” Based on international
pressure for a prompt and honest trial,
the judiciary held that a military tribunal
was not competent to try these soldiers.
Despite the judiciary’s efforts to promote
efficiency, the trial lasted approximately
twenty months, involved no less than 100
testimonies, and cost millions of dollars.
During this time, President Uribe admitted
before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in Costa Rica that “in
Jamundí, the army had murdered some
policemen.”
Two years after the massacre, Judge
Edmundo López delivered his official verdict, finding that Colonel Carvajal ordered
an ambush on the counter-narcotics agents
and that the other 14 participants were
responsible as co-conspirators. During the
trial, the Prosecutor brought 33 witnesses
and 417 photos demonstrating that the
massacre’s aim was to protect cocaine
from discovery. In early May, Judge López
handed down a 54-year sentence for Carvajal, a 52-year sentence for his secondin-command, and 13 50-year sentences for
the remaining participants. The maximum
murder sentence in Colombia is 60 years.
Equipo Nizkor, a regional human rights
NGO, proposes that this massacre suggests
a strong link between Colombian drug
dealers and the military.

Africa
Liberia Creates Special Court
for Sexual Violence
Liberia’s 14-year civil war displaced
approximately 850,000 people and caused
the deaths of about 270,000 more. During
this conflict, rape and violence against
young girls and women ran rampant; and
despite Liberia’s peace deal signed in
2003, the violence against women has
continued, and the perpetrators commit
these crimes with impunity. A government
survey conducted between 2005 and 2006
in ten of Liberia’s 15 counties reported
that out of the 1,600 women interviewed,
92 percent reported having been victims of
sexual violence.
In response to the escalating violence
against women, Liberia’s Information Minister, Laurence Bropleh, told the Integrated
Regional Information Network (IRIN) that
the Liberian government has created a
special court to deal with the rising rape
cases, as well as other forms of violence
against women.
In December 2005, the Liberian government enacted a new law criminalizing
rape and providing sentences ranging from
seven years to life imprisonment. Since
then, according to government statistics,
instances of rape have continued to increase,
with about half of the reported cases being
committed against girls between the ages
of ten and 15. A December 2006 IRIN
article reported that rapes against young
girls and women occurred on a daily basis,
with most cases going unreported in the
news.
Regular courts currently do not address
sexual violence because state prosecutors
are busy with other cases. This has resulted
in a slow progression of rape cases through
the court system. In other instances, the victims of sexual violence are either deterred
by the stigma associated with rape or are
too scared to file complaints.
Advocacy groups, including the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
(AFELL), have been advocating for the
special court for two years. In November
2007, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) issued a report saying, “[t]he
failure of the state to prosecute impacted
negatively on the rights of women and
girls to equal protection afforded by the
35

law.” The establishment of the new court,
however, serves as a promising step for
women’s rights.
Charlotte Abaka, UNMIL Independent
Human Rights Expert, said that she is
“encouraged” by the steps taken to create
the special court and that “[t]he undue
delay in prosecuting such cases will now
be a thing of the past.”

Child Sex Workers in Ghana
In response to the rising number of
child sex workers in Ghana, the government has decided to crack down on the
child prostitution epidemic. The Women
and Children’s Affairs Ministry reports
that while actual figures are unavailable,
the number of child sex workers in Ghana
is in the thousands. An estimated 20,000
children live on the streets in the nation’s
capital, Accra. Dr. Obiri Yeboah, a sociologist at the Accra-Polytechnic Institute,
believes that Ghana’s increasing urbanization and the collapse of the traditional
extended family system has led to a rise in
the sex trade.
Another factor contributing to the
increasing number of child sex workers has
been an increasing demand for such services. In February 2008, Ghanaian police
raided the Soldier Bar brothel and arrested
all of the 160 girls and women working
there. The specific targets of the raid were
60 girls who were under the age of 16,
who had been recruited by the brothel’s
manager to service teenage clientele. Initially, the manager did not admit teenage
boys into the brothel, but as the manager
told reporters, “… after a while we realized we could make more money if we
can meet their demands by supplying them
with younger prostitutes of the same age,
so we started recruiting child sex workers
as well.”
The increased number of child prostitutes has also led to an increase in the number of young girls becoming infected with
HIV/AIDS. The Ghana AIDS Commission
estimates that around 25,000 children have
HIV/AIDS. According to the Commission,
with no protection and no say in whether
their male clients use protection, the young
girls “contract HIV/AIDS and often die
in silence.” The Commission states that
the rising number of children becoming
infected with HIV/AIDS reflects the social
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structure and poverty of the country, which
has in turn laid “a fertile foundation for
such brothels to thrive.”
In response to the crisis, the Ministry of
Women and Children’s Affairs established
programs designed to rescue, rehabilitate
and reintegrate the young sex workers by
placing them in centers where they can
receive help. In conjunction with these
efforts, the Ghanaian police launched a
“war on child prostitution.” While such
programs are a step in the right direction,
they are not perfect. They are significantly
underfunded, and the lack of personnel and
accommodations for the young girls often
makes it difficult to keep track of them.
Consequently, many girls return to the
streets to work in the sex trade.
The government plans to involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in its
efforts, and to teach the girls vocational
skills so they do not have to resort to the
sex trade. A committee has also been
formed to provide further funding to the
NGOs. As Dr. Yeboah told IRIN, “[t]he
solution starts with economic empowerment and an intensive educational campaign to get families to be more conscious
of their responsibilities to these children.”

Middle East
Palestinians Challenge
Highway Segregation in the
West Bank
Highway 443, a major access road
connecting Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, has
emerged as a contentious battleground
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until
recently, the road primarily served Palestinians, largely because it runs through the
West Bank. In recent years as violence has
escalated, Israel has restricted Palestinian
access to Highway 443.
In March 2008, the Israeli Supreme
Court issued an interim decision, accepting
the idea of separate roads for Palestinians
in the occupied areas. The Association for
Civil Rights in Israel, one of the petitioners
in the case, asserted that establishing separate highways for Israelis and Palestinians
could be the beginning of legal apartheid
in the West Bank. Palestinian petitioners
argued that in accordance with the Fourth
Geneva Convention, Israel, as an occupier,
has a responsibility to safeguard the needs

of the Palestinians, who are protected persons. Since highway restrictions burden
Palestinians in the Palestinian territories,
for whom Highway 443 was originally
built, petitioners argued that the segregated road system violated the Geneva
Convention.
The Supreme Court’s one-paragraph
decision calls on the army to give a progress report within six months on its effort
to build separate roads and to compensate
Palestinians because of the road restriction.
But the court’s acceptance of separate roads
for Israelis and Palestinians has stimulated
controversy. In an op-ed in the Jerusalem
newspaper Haaretz, David Kretzmer, an
Emeritus Professor of International Law at
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, criticized
the “judicial hypocrisy” of Israel’s subjugation of the Palestinians. Kretzmer noted
that while heightened security concerns
may have forced a change in the road’s
mixed use, Israelis should not be allowed
to travel on a road that was primarily built
for Palestinian use.
Highway 443 was first challenged in
the Supreme Court in the early 1980s as an
illegal expropriation of private Palestinian
land. In a landmark ruling, Israeli Supreme
Court Justices ruled that the road was
permissible because it mainly served local
Palestinians rather than Israeli commuters.
Recently, however, the Israeli government
has restricted Palestinians from using the
roadway. In defense of implementing a
two-tiered road system, the Israeli government argued that terrorism threats justified
the exclusion of Palestinians from Highway
443. In particular, recent suicide bombings
on the highway were cited as evidence of
social harm. Some legal commentators
within Israel have argued that the restriction serves not to reduce terrorism, but to
reduce traffic to make the commute for
Israelis more convenient. As an alternative
to Highway 443, Israel is planning to build
a new road within the West Bank that links
the Palestinian villages with Ramallah.
This road will be used to accommodate
Palestinian travel.
Lack of access to Highway 443 has
severely burdened the 30,000 Palestinians who live in surrounding villages.
Because the highway connects these villages to Ramallah, a main city within the
West Bank, the exclusionary policy greatly
inconveniences many people. In one vil36

lage, A Tira, only 14 taxis have permits to
travel the road, and only during daylight.
Aside from the general inconvenience of
not being able to use a main artery, by barring Palestinians from Highway 443, the
Israeli government is impairing West Bank
Palestinians access to necessary medical
care. Instead of using the main highway,
Palestinians now have to travel longer
distances to reach services in Ramallah.
While security interests are critical, the
Israeli Supreme Court’s decision regarding the permissibility of segregated roads
poses serious implications for the human
rights of the Palestinian people.

Arbitrary Arrests and Torture
in Libya
At least 14 Libyans were arrested in
February 2007 for planning to hold a
peaceful demonstration in Tripoli. On February 1, 2007, political activists advertised the demonstration on news websites
based outside Libya. The activists were
arrested two weeks later, on February 16,
2007. Idriss Boufayed, one of the activists
arrested, is an outspoken critic of the Libyan government’s extensive human rights
violations. The members of the group who
have been charged are accused of offenses
including “attempting to overthrow the
political system,” “possession of weapons
and explosives with the intention of carrying out subversive activities,” and “communication with enemy powers.”
According to Amnesty International,
12 of the 14 Libyans arrested may face
unfair trials before a newly-created State
Security Court, and could be given the
death penalty if found guilty. Although
Libyan law provides for the presumption
of innocence and the right to legal counsel,
in practice, defendants often have little
contact, if any, with their lawyers. The
two remaining accused have disappeared
since their arrests last year. The Libyan
government has not provided any information regarding their whereabouts. Reports
indicate that all of the men were held in
solitary confinement for prolonged periods
and that at least two of them have been
tortured. During one interrogation session,
these two men were allegedly punched
and beaten with sticks, subjected to falaqa
(beating on the soles of the feet) and put in
coffins to intimidate them. The men also
lack access to necessary medical care.
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As a signatory to the Universal Declara
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Libya must comply with
international prohibitions against arbitrary
detention, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. The Libyan government is in violation of Article 5 of the
UDHR; Articles 7, 9, and 10 of the ICCPR;
and the CAT, for arbitrarily arresting these
men and for torturing two of them. Under
Article 5 of the UDHR, Article 7 of the
ICCPR and the CAT, “[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Subjecting prisoners to physical abuse constitutes either torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. Moreover, confining
individuals in coffins is unquestionably a
cruel punishment that violates international
law.
Article 9 of the ICCPR stipulates that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention.” Although the detainees have been charged with crimes, the
offenses reported are arbitrary and have
not been supported by any credible evidence. The charges merely mask the true
purpose for the arrests: to suppress criticism of the government. Additionally,
Article 10 of the ICCPR states that “[a]ll
persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person.”
Prolonged arbitrary detention and torture
indisputably violate this provision.
Amnesty International asserts that the
men were exercising their right to freedom
of expression and calls for their immediate
and unconditional release. The organization has also urged the Libyan government
to ensure that the men are receiving access
to medical care and that the authorities
conduct a thorough, impartial investigation
into this matter.

Syrian Security Forces’ Killing
of Kurds Raises Concern of
Unnecessary Lethal Force

shootings raise concerns that state security
forces used unnecessary lethal force in violation of international law. About 200 people gathered on a road in the Western part
of Qamishli and lit candles and a bonfire,
around which some participants performed
a traditional Kurdish dance. Firefighters
extinguished the bonfire while police and
intelligence officers fired tear gas canisters
and live ammunition in the air to disperse
the crowd. According to witnesses, security forces indiscriminately opened fire
when the crowd failed to disperse.
Because none of the Kurds were armed
or behaving violently, it is unclear what
provoked the security forces to use deadly
force. This, however, is not the first time
that Syrian forces have used force to disrupt a Kurdish celebration. In March 2006,
security officers arrested dozens of Kurds
and used tear gas and batons to break up
New Year’s festivities. In addition, in
March 2004, 25 people were killed and
more than 100 wounded when riots broke
out between Syrian Kurds and Arabs during a soccer match in Qamishli. Nearly
2,000 Kurds were arrested by the Syrian
security forces following the riots. Despite
calls for Syrian officials to justify the use
of lethal force, these authorities have thus
far not issued an official statement on the
most recent incident.
HRW maintains that Syrian security
forces should comply with the United
Nations Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials. These principles mandate that
law enforcement officials exercise nonviolent means before resorting to the use
of force. Furthermore, force should only
be exerted in proportion to the gravity of
the offense, and lethal force only when
necessary to protect life. Reports strongly
suggest that the use of lethal force does not
withstand the proportionality and necessity
requirements. Specifically, the fact that the
participants were unarmed and were not
engaging in violent activity raises serious
suspicion of an illegitimate state response.
HRW has called on Syrian authorities
to conduct an independent, transparent
investigation into the shootings and hold
accountable those individuals responsible.

On March 20, 2008, Syrian security
forces shot and killed three Kurds and
wounded at least five others at a New
Year’s celebration. Human Rights Watch
(HRW) asserts that the circumstances of the
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Europe
Turkey Lifts Headscarf Ban in
Public Universities
In February 2008 the Turkish parliament passed two constitutional amendments, lifting the ban on headscarves in
public universities. Although Turkey is
over 99 percent Muslim, it has remained a
secular state in line with the policies of its
revered secular founder Kemal Ataturk. In
keeping with its commitment to secularism, Turkey banned women from wearing
headscarves while attending public universities and working in the public sector for
two decades. Although this ban is based
on a 1989 Constitutional Court ruling, it
has only been strictly enforced since the
1997 military-led expulsion from power
of Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister
Necmettin Erbakan.
The ban is widely seen as unjust and
unequally enforced. University rectors
often tacitly allow some students to wear
their headscarves, while prohibiting others,
who for example, evade the rule by wearing wigs or wigs over their headscarves,
from attending school. As a result of the
ban, many women, including the daughters
of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, choose to go abroad to pursue
their higher educations. Since its rise to
power in 2002, the governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP) has been under
pressure from its conservative base to lift
the ban.
The change, which was proposed by the
Islamic-rooted AKP, alters two articles of
the Constitution, amending it to read that
no one can be barred from education for
reasons not clearly laid out by law and that
everyone has the right to equal treatment
from state institutions, including universities. President Abdullah Gul, who had his
daughter wear a wig over her headscarf
during the ban, ratified the bill. The legislation was prompted when the Prime Minister commented to the press in Madrid that
“Even if wearing a headscarf is a political
symbol, can you ban a political symbol?”
Since this statement, the Nationalist Action
Party (MHP), a hard-line group that has
resisted reforms that would bring Turkey
closer to EU membership, has continued
to push the cause. The AKP formed an
alliance with the MHP to pass the new legislation. The two groups, who control more
than the two-thirds of the parliamentary
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votes necessary to pass the amendment,
struck a deal in late January.
The Turkish parliament began debating the amendments on February 6. The
amendment passed an initial parliamentary
vote that same day and was passed by a
final vote on February 9. Parliament must
now draft legislation, which will provide
for the shape and type of the permitted
headscarves. Nearly 100 of Turkey’s 116
universities are still observing the ban.
President Gul, whose wife considered
challenging Turkey’s headscarf ban in
the European Court of Human Rights,
expressed his support for the amendment,
stating that “beliefs should be practiced
freely.” The AKP claims that this is an
issue of women’s rights. Additionally,
opinion polls indicate that two-thirds of the
Turkish public support lifting the ban.
However, there has also been vehement
opposition to the new amendment from
groups including the judiciary, business
organizations and academics, who claim
that it is a step towards turning Turkey into
a religious state. The military, which has
overturned four civilian governments and
has acted as a guardian of the country’s
secular system, has thus far only voiced its
opposition to the amendments. In March,
a prosecutor filed a case against the AKP
for its anti-secularism, largely based on
its support of the headscarf. A case has
also been filed against the constitutional
amendments as well. Public opposition
has been most apparent at public protests,
which have involved tens of thousands
of people. The first took place outside
the mausoleum of Ataturk, and the second occurred on February 9, when people
gathered in Ankara to voice their dissent.
Critics fear that lifting the ban threatens
Turkey’s existence as a secular state and
compromises its chances at becoming a
member of the European Union (EU).
Even supporters of the constitutional
amendment have voiced concerns about
its specificity. The amendment only allows
women to wear one traditional kind of
headscarf, which ties under the throat,
while still banning other styles. This apparent mandate on fashion has drawn criticism
spanning from women’s groups to experts
on the constitution. Further, lifting the ban
will only affect public universities; the ban
will still apply to women working in the
public sector. Many view the narrow scope

of this change as indicative of the patriarchy of Turkish society and the place that
women hold in it.
Although Ali Babacan, Turkey’s foreign minister, claimed that this change is
part of the movement towards fulfilling EU
membership requirements, EU officials
have said that this is a Turkish domestic
matter. They have also expressed concern
that in its haste to resolve the headscarf
issue, the AKP has stalled on other reforms
that are related to EU membership, including the passage of its new “civilianized
constitution” and the amendment of Article
301 of the penal code, which outlaws
insulting “Turkishness” and has marred
Turkey’s record on freedom of expression.
Most importantly, the AKP has suspended
parliamentary debate over a bill that would
return state-confiscated property of religious minority groups as a result of its
reluctance to upset the nationalist National
Action Party (MHP), the third largest party
in the Turkish parliament, which opposes
such legislation.
Critics of the amendments charge that
the AKP must prove its commitment to
democracy. The bill now faces a legal challenge brought by The Republican People’s
Party (CHP) to the Constitutional Court in
an effort to block this amendment.

Possible Change to
Romania’s Family Code
Threatens Gay Rights
As one of the last European countries
to decriminalize homosexuality, Romania has made great strides in promoting
equality over the past decade. As a result
of ten years of advocacy by human rights
groups, the country repealed its law against
“manifestations of homosexuality” in 2001.
Since then, Romania has passed legislation
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment and public services. Romania also allows individuals
who have undergone gender reassignment
to change their identity. Upon entry into
the EU, Romania was required to recognize same-sex couples that were registered
in other member states. A December 2006
poll by the EU, however, revealed that
only 11 percent of Romanians approve of
same-sex marriages.
Currently, Article 1(3) of Romania’s
family code, which dates back to 1953,
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defines family in gender-neutral terms, stating that it is based on “marriage between
spouses.” A proposed amendment to this
code would narrow the definition of marriage as exclusively between a man and
a woman. The Romanian Senate’s Judiciary Committee debated and adopted this
amendment, which expressly bans marriage between same-sex partners. Romanian senators approved the amendment
on February 13, 2008, and it will now be
considered by the Chamber of Deputies.
The amendment has garnered support
from many groups. Its largest supporter is
the Greater Romanian Party, a nationalist,
right-wing party led by former presidential candidate Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The
party justifies the amendment as “defending
the institution of marriage.” Additionally,
some religious groups have been instrumental in supporting the legislation. The
Alliance of Romania’s Families, formed
last year, collected more than 650,000 signatures in support of the amendment. The
amendment also gained international support from the World Congress of Families.
Social Democratic Party Senator Serban
Nicolae, who proposed the amendment,
claims that the amendment would not
infringe on European norms.
The legislation, however, has also
encountered significant opposition. Human
Rights Watch is one of its most outspoken
critics. The organization’s Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender Rights Program
stated that “these proposals not only deliberately discriminate against same-sex couples but threaten their families, including
children.” It characterized the legislation as
“an insult to Romania’s achievements elsewhere in overcoming discrimination.” The
organization sent a letter to government
officials, urging them to reject the amendment. Sexual orientation-related-advocacy
groups have followed suit by beginning
their own letter-writing campaigns.
If the changes to the family code are
implemented, the impact of this legislation
is likely to be far-reaching. Human Rights
Watch predicts that introducing inequality
into the law will deprive many Romanian families of basic civil rights. Senator
Gyorgy Frunda of the Democratic Union
of Magyars (UDMR), a party that represents ethnic Hungarians in Romania, has
voiced concerns that the amendment could
result in Romania being brought before the
European Court of Human Rights.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 7

South and Central Asia
Tajikistan: Efforts to
Modernize Criminal Code May
Fall Short of International
Human Rights Law
In March Tajikistan modernized its
criminal code to comply with international human rights laws by adopting an
exclusionary rule. Now, evidence obtained
through unlawful means, including torture or coercion, can no longer be used
against the accused and will be excluded
from trial. In 2007, the International Helsinki Federation Annual Report on Human
Rights Violations and the United Nations
Committee Against Torture (the Committee) reported frequent human rights
violations in connection with arrest and
detention procedures in Tajikistan. The
Committee was particularly concerned that
evidence gathered through torture by law
enforcement officials was used in legal
proceedings against the accused. The Committee reported that this was partially due
to a lack of legislation prohibiting the
use of illegally acquired evidence. The
Government of Tajikistan responded by
updating the criminal code. The updating
process has been ongoing since Tajikistan
independence in 1991.
Despite efforts to bring the law into
compliance with the Convention against
Torture (CAT), there are still deficiencies in the criminal code and within law
enforcement methods that will make the
application of the exclusionary rule difficult. First, the provision excluding illegally obtained evidence does not specify
whether all evidence stemming from a
substantial violation of the criminal code
would be excluded or only the evidence
directly acquired through illegal means
such as torture and coercion. Furthermore,
courts have not given any criteria to decide
whether evidence is excludable or not. For
these reasons, the exclusionary rule may
not, in practice, protect the rights of Tajikistan’s citizens.
Second, the definition of torture in
Tajikistan’s criminal code does not comply with the definition of torture under
the CAT. Tajikistan’s definition does not
include the CAT’s definition, “the infliction of pain and suffering by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiesce
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Furthermore,

law enforcement officials are not trained
on legal methods of obtaining evidence
without the use of torture. While nongovernmental organizations received, and
reported to the Committee, a number of
complaints of police torture, very few
resulted in legal proceedings against law
enforcement officials. These deficiencies
point to the fact that there is no liability or
penalty against law enforcement officials
for illegal conduct. It is yet to be seen
how Tajikistan’s exclusionary rule will
be applied and whether it will adequately
protect the rights of those accused.
If there is no repercussion for using
illegal means to obtain evidence, then there
is no disincentive to law enforcement for
using torture or threats to obtain evidence.
Although pressure by the International Helsinki Federation Annual Report on Human
Rights Violations and the Committee were
successful in amending Tajikistan’s Criminal Code, significant measures have not
been taken by Tajikistan’s Parliament to
ensure that evidence obtained through torture and threats will not be used in legal
proceedings against the accused.

Bangladesh: High Courts
Efforts to Uphold Constitution
Quashed
On March 17, 2008, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh took
away jurisdictional authority of two High
Court judges after the judges challenged
the Emergency Power Rules (EPR), which
have been in effect since January 12, 2007.
Officials have explained the judges’ loss of
some authority as a “routine reallocation
of power.” There is skepticism, however,
as to the real reasons behind the Supreme
Court’s mandate removing jurisdiction
from the High Court judges.
The mandate came just two days before
the High Court was scheduled to hear a
petition challenging the validity of military
rule. The military government promised to
hold national elections but has failed to do
so since the emergency was promulgated
last year. The High Court has also recently
declared illegal the extortion case against
former Prime Minister Sheik Hasina under
the EPR and quashed the trial proceedings.
The High Court held that since the EPR is
unconstitutional, hearings on her extortion
case cannot be held until the constitution is
restored and emergency rule has ended.
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The former Prime Minister was arrested
on July 24, 2007, six months after emergency rule was declared. She is accused of
extorting money from the Managing Director of Eastcoast Trading Pvt. Ltd., Azam
Chowdhury, in exchange for granting Eastcoast a contract to set up a power plant in
Bangladesh. On July 30, 2007 the High
Court held that the EPR cannot be retroactively applied because the circumstances
of Hasina’s extortion case occurred before
the EPR was promulgated. Moreover, the
High Court held that it would be a violation of the Constitution if a crime committed before the promulgation of the EPR
is tried under the EPR: only a crime committed after the EPR’s promulgation could
be tried under the EPR. The High Court
further reiterated its power and authority
to adjudicate cases relating to bail despite
the EPR. In light of the Constitution of
Bangladesh, the High Court held that the
Emergency Rules limiting the right to
bail are unenforceable against Hasina. On
review, the Supreme Court overruled the
High Court’s decision in the extortion case
and bail order. The Supreme Court held
that the High Courts did not have jurisdiction to grant bail under the EPR.
Under Bangladesh’s Constitution, a
state of emergency authorizes the suspension of fundamental rights of citizens and
bans all political activity. While the state
of emergency might have been necessary
last year, recently the High Courts, through
judicial decisions, have been putting pressure on the military government to lift the
state of emergency. In these decisions, the
High Courts have held that the procedures
and processes of the military under the
EPR are illegal and void. The High Court
judges, along with many other Bengalis, believe there is no longer a need for
military rule. They are calling for a return
to civilian rule and a restoration of the
Constitution of Bangladesh. The Supreme
Court, however, is upholding the EPR and
showing no independence from the military government.
The emergency government, led by
Fakhruddin Ahmed, took power on January 12, 2008 — one day after elections
were cancelled. Bangladesh has a history of military rule. There have been
19 coup attempts in Bangladesh since it
gained independence in 1971. In this latest
promulgation of emergency rule, the High
Courts have attempted to show judicial
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independence from the military government. The High Court’s efforts to hold the
EPR unconstitutional and show their independence, however, have been frustrated
by the Supreme Court’s backing of the
military government.

The Maldives: New
Constitution Could Mean End
to President’s 30 Year Term
After 30 years of what many consider
to be a dictatorship by President Maumoon
Abdul Gayoom, the Maldives is in the
process of promulgating a new constitution with democratic separation of powers
between the executive, parliamentary, and
judicial branches of government. Under
the current constitution, there is no independent judiciary. The President holds the
position as the highest judicial authority.
Parliament is eager to draft a new constitution before November 8, 2008, the date
President Gayoom’s term expires. Consti
tutional reform will dramatically change
the government in the Maldives and allow
for free and fair elections for the first time
in the country’s history.
The Maldives is known for corruption
and lack of democracy. Political parties
were only legalized in 2005 after demonstrations calling for government reforms.
The President appoints 29 members of
Parliament from his party, the Dhivehi
Raiyyithunge Party (DRP), and for this
reason, the DRP holds a built-in majority
in Parliament. The DRP drafted a proposal
allowing President Gayoom to continue
for another term after the expiration of his
term on November 11, 2008. The opposition party, the Maldivian Democratic
Party (MDP), however, argues that since
Gayoom has held the Presidential office
for 30 years, he should not be allowed to
run for another term. This dispute cumulated on April 3, 2008, when the DRP
walked out of the Parliament building just
as Parliament was about to vote on the
term-extending amendment. The DRP and
MDP are now in the process of continuing
negotiations over proposals in the constitution and are in a rush to employ a new
constitution before President Gayoom’s
term expires.
The Constitution of the Maldives
was last amended in 1997; however, it is
believed that these amendments were made
without fair consultation with Parliament.

This is the first time in 30 years that members of Parliament are consulting on every
proposal presented by the parties.
It is widely believed that President
Gayoom won the 2003 elections illegally.
Opposition political parties are reluctant to
approve a proposal that would allow him to
run for another term. They believe if he is
able to run, then there will be no chance for
fair elections. The MDP instead demands
that an interim government be put in place
before elections to guarantee that the process is more fair and free.

East and Southeast Asia
and the Pacific
Minority Rights Issues
Reshape Political Landscape in
Malaysian Election
Malaysia’s March 8, 2008 elections
may be seen as a rebuff of its anti-minority policies and restrictions on political
expression. Despite controlling all major
print and broadcast media and limiting
opposition parties’ access to the political
process, the ruling National Front coalition led by the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) lost its two-thirds
majority in parliament and ceded control
of five states. For the first time since 1969,
the National Front will not have the supermajority in parliament necessary to amend
the constitution at will.
The National Front’s political setback
was fueled in part by minority rights groups,
such as the Hindu Rights Action Force
(Hindraf), who assert that the government
denies ethnic Indians their political, economic, and religious freedoms. Malaysia
is comprised of three main ethnic groups:
over half of the population is Malay, 23
percent is Chinese, and seven percent is
Indian. Many Indians are upset by unequal
funding provided to Tamil-speaking public
schools and by the New Economic Policy
(NEP), an affirmative action program that
favors the Malay majority. The NEP was
originally instituted in 1971 to combat
social and economic disparities between
Malays and ethnic Chinese. Today, minorities such as ethnic Indians feel discriminated against by policies that guarantee
Malays discounts on new housing and
place 30 percent quotas on government
jobs.
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The National Front has controlled the
Parliament since Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1957. Emergency
rule was declared in the wake of race riots
in 1969 and civil and political liberties are
limited to this day. The National Front continues to suppress political expression to
maintain electoral dominance. The police
restrict opposition groups from assembling
freely by denying them permits to hold
public gatherings of four or more people,
while National Front leaders routinely
organize public rallies. Prime Minister
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi freely spoke in
front of 20,000 supporters a week before
the election, and opposition groups face
excessive force from police. Police used
tear gas and water cannons to break up a
peaceful Hindraf march on February 16,
2008.
The National Front denies media access
to those with opposing viewpoints. The
Sedition Act and Printing Press Publications Act are used to stifle public criticism
of government officials. All private television stations are owned by UMNO, and
the government wields heavy influence
over all major newspapers. Prime Minister Badawi, who serves as the Minister
of Internal Security, can effectively shut
down any publication by revoking its permit to operate.

Philippine Supreme Court
Upholds Executive Privilege
The Supreme Court of the Philippines
may have further enabled the Admin
istration, led by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, to resist litigation filed against
it for committing hundreds of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, by
upholding a claim of executive privilege
on March 25, 2008. In Neri v. Senate, the
court overturned a contempt citation and
arrest order compelling former National
Economic Development Authority Director General Romulo Neri to testify before
the Philippine Senate. Neri refused to talk
about conversations he had with President
Arroyo regarding alleged bribery in a controversial deal, which awarded a Chinese
telecommunications company a contract
to construct the government-managed
National Broadband Network. The Court
held that as a member of the Cabinet,
Neri’s conversations with the President
were privileged, and the Senate would

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 7
have to show “compelling need” and “the
unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigation authority.”

China Avoids Condemnation
from United Nations Human
Rights Council on Tibet

Human rights organizations in the Philippines, such as the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG), are concerned that the
Arroyo Administration will use the ruling to claim executive privilege when
confronted with allegations of rampant
extrajudicial killings and kidnappings by
the military. In 2006 President Arroyo
vowed to eradicate the New People’s Army
(NPA), a communist insurgent group, and
a dramatic spike in extrajudicial killings
followed. Military and paramilitary forces
have not only targeted leftists, but also
continue to attack groups or individuals
who criticize the government. In 2007,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Killings reported that at least
100 journalists, labor leaders, land reform
advocates, and church members had been
kidnapped or killed by the military since
2005. Although the Arroyo Administration set up a taskforce to investigate these
incidents, no member of the military has
been convicted of extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance.

The United Nations Human Rights
Council (HRC) failed to pass a resolution addressing the abuse of protesters in
Tibet. In the HRC’s four-week session
that concluded on March 28, 2008, China
repeatedly blocked discussion of its recent
crackdown on demonstrations.

In response to international criticism,
the Supreme Court, in July 2007, created
new rules establishing the writ of amparo,
designed to prevent the government from
stalling enforced disappearance cases.
Usually, when a family member of a missing person files a habeas corpus petition,
government officials simply deny that the
person is in its custody. Now when a writ
of amparo is filed, the government must
produce evidence proving that the person
is not in its custody. The government must
also look for the person, and if the court
finds the search effort insufficient, the
government could be held liable.
Philippine courts have yet to enforce a
writ of amparo case, and jurisprudence on
the subject is still up in the air. Critics of
Neri v. Senate, such as FLAG, fear that the
expansion of the executive privilege doctrine may enable the government to resist
writ of amparo claims, making the new
human rights legal tool ineffective.

Violence erupted in Tibet on March
14 after the Chinese government arrested
Buddhist Monks, who staged a peaceful
march outside the capital city of Lhasa
on March 10 to commemorate the failed
uprising of 1959. The Seven Point Agreement of 1951 officially incorporated Tibet
into the People’s Republic of China but
established an autonomous government
headed by the Dalai Lama. Chinese land
redistribution programs disrupted the delicate relationship with Tibet when noblemen and feudal lords stripped of their land
organized a revolt.
After the March 10 arrests, protests
spread to other cities in Tibet, western
Chinese provinces, and Tibetan communities in Nepal and India. Riots broke out
in Lhasa and other cities in the western
Chinese provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and
Qinghai. Rioters flipped cars and torched
shops belonging to ethnic Hans, who make
up the majority in China. Chinese military
police violently broke up the protests and
opened fire into the crowds. The Chinese government claims that 18 civilians,
mostly Hans, died in the violence, and
that another 625 were injured, but Tibetan
rights groups report more than 140 Tibetan
civilian deaths. Independent news agencies have been unable to make an accurate
casualty count because the Chinese government expelled foreign journalists from
the region shortly after the demonstrations
began.
Although delegations from the United
States, Australia, and the European Union
made declarations about the violence in
Tibet at the HRC meeting, China cut off
discussion by making procedural objections. HRC President Doru Costea upheld
the objections by ruling that discussion of
country-specific human rights situations
was only allowed in special sessions dealing with individual countries. Although
the HRC held special sessions addressing
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specific human rights issues in Burma and
Israel, China avoided such scrutiny.
China’s economic power is influential
with many Asian and African countries,
which make up more than half of the
HRC’s 47 members. China provides political cover for other countries with poor
human rights records, such as Sudan and
Burma, by maintaining strong diplomatic
and trade ties when the rest of the international community is levying sanctions.
China continues to trade arms for oil with
Sudan, debilitating other states’ embargo
efforts and fueling the conflict in the
Darfur region that has killed more than
200,000 people.
China remains the closest ally to the
military junta that governs Burma, supplying the majority of its arms and military
training. After the Burmese junta violently
quashed large scale protests in late 2007,
China blocked a resolution at an emergency session of United Nations Security
Council calling for global economic sanctions. While the HRC passed a resolution
condemning the junta’s actions in Burma,
it remained silent on China’s actions in
Tibet.			
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